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The security of quantum cryptography is guaranteed by the no-cloning theorem, which implies
that an eavesdropper copying transmitted qubits in unknown states causes their disturbance. Nev-
ertheless, in real cryptographic systems some level of disturbance has to be allowed to cover, e.g.,
transmission losses. An eavesdropper can attack such systems by replacing a noisy channel by a
better one and by performing approximate cloning of transmitted qubits which disturb them but
below the noise level assumed by legitimate users. We experimentally demonstrate such symmet-
ric individual eavesdropping on the quantum key distribution protocols of Bennett and Brassard
(BB84) and the trine-state spherical code of Renes (R04) with two-level probes prepared using a
recently developed photonic multifunctional quantum cloner [K. Lemr et al., Phys. Rev. A 85,
050307(R) (2012)]. We demonstrated that our optimal cloning device with high-success rate makes
the eavesdropping possible by hiding it in usual transmission losses. We believe that this experiment
can stimulate the quest for other operational applications of quantum cloning.
PACS numbers: 42.50.Ex, 03.67.Ac, 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Lx
During the last decades, there has been much interest
in secure quantum communication [1, 2]. Quantum key
distribution (QKD) devices (apart from quantum metrol-
ogy, random number generators and adiabatic comput-
ers based on quantum annealing) are arguably the only
second-generation quantum technologies providing com-
mercially available applications of quantum information
and quantum optics up to date [3]. The security of QKD
follows from Heisenberg’s uncertainty relation or, equiv-
alently, the no-cloning theorem. However, QKD can be
secure only below some level of noise that unavoidably oc-
cur in any physical system. Therefore, security bounds of
QKDs are expressed in terms of tolerated losses or noise.
For QKD to be secure Alice and Bob must operate on
single photons; hence, they need a single-photon source
(SPS). SPSs are usually implemented as a weak coherent
pulse of light [1]; thus, QKD are prone to photon-number
splitting attacks. This attack can be circumvented by,
e.g., using decoy states [4] or heralded SPS instead of
weak coherent pulses. Since there are no lossless chan-
nels, if the eavesdropper (Eve) is equipped with a proper
cloning machine mimicking the lossy channel then she
can clone (a part of) the state sent by Alice, while hiding
her presence in usual transmission losses.
Recent proposals of applications of quantum cloning [5]
range from quantum cryptography [6] and quantum
metrology [7] to nonclassicality tests in microscopic-
macroscopic systems [8] and, even, proposals related to
quantum experiments with human eyes [9].
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In this Letter, we experimentally demonstrate the use-
fulness of cloning for quantum cryptoanalysis, i.e., for the
eavesdropping of QKD over noisy quantum channels.
There are a number of well-known QKDs including
the famous BB84 of Bennett and Brassard [10] based
on mutually unbiased bases and the biased-bases R04
of Renes [11]. Attacks on those protocols can be classi-
fied as individual (or incoherent) and coherent (including
joint and collective) [1]. Every attack can be imagined
as follows: Eve sends a photon (probe) prepared in some
polarization state which interacts with a photon sent by
Alice, then Eve sends a photon to Bob and performs a
measurement on her probe (she might wait until the key
sifting process is over). Recently, attacks on QKD were
proposed exploiting technological loopholes rather than
the limits imposed by physics [12, 13]. However, in this
Letter we analyze the physical bounds on the security of
the QKDs.
We focus only on individual attacks on the two QKDs
assuming that Eve waits until Alice and Bob complete
key sifting and then performs her measurements. This
kind of attack requires that Eve has access to quantum
memory (QM) in order to store her probes during the
key sifting, but does not require Eve to perform a co-
herent measurement on many photons at a time. Such
satisfactory memory has not been invented yet; however,
recent encouraging results [14] carry the promise of real-
izing good QMs in near future. Moreover, in our opinion,
coherent multi-qubit readout may require an additional
technological leap. For clarity of presentation we focus
only on trine-state R04 and BB84. Nevertheless, our ap-
proach can be used for analyzing generalizations of those
protocols. By referring hereafter to R04 we mean its
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Diagram describing R04 [11]. Alice
(Bob) publicly agrees beforehand to send (measure) one of the
trine states marked by red (black) dots, respectively. Both
agree that the clockwise (anticlockwise) sequence of their
states corresponds, e.g., to bit 1 (0). Bob publicly informs
Alice what he has not measured (marked by an exclamation
mark). Alice ignores the inconclusive cases (and informs Bob
about them). In the other two cases, Alice and Bob obtain
the same bit value.
trine-state version.
It is known that the acceptable quantum bit error rate
(QBER), i.e., the ratio of the number of wrong qubits to
the total number of qubits received, is 15% [15] for BB84
and 16.7% [11] for R04 assuming an individual attack
with a four-level probe and that Eve does not wait for the
key sifting. These QBER bounds could suggest that R04
is more robust to eavesdropping than BB84. However,
it was shown that, by assuming one-way communication
between Alice and Bob, BB84 is unconditionally secure if
QBER ≤ 11% [16], while R04 if QBER ≤ 9.85% [17]. On
the other hand, if Eve waits for the key sifting process to
finish, BB84 is secure if QBER ≤ 14.6% [18] (or 15% [19]
for the two-level probe), while the corresponding QBER
bound for R04 is unknown to our knowledge. Neverthe-
less, in this Letter we show that the QBER bound for
R04 and BB84 is 16.7% for the optimal cloning attack
with a two-level probe.
The algorithm for the cloning-based eavesdropping in-
vestigated in our Letter reads as follows: (i) Eve plugs
a cloning machine together with QM into the quantum
communication channel between Alice and Bob. (ii) Al-
ice sends one of the states used in BB84 or R04. (iii)
Eve intercepts the state and prepares two noisy copies.
This cloning introduces losses. (iv) Eve sends one copy to
Bob and keeps the other copy in QM. (v) Bob measures
the received copy. (vi) Alice and Bob publicly perform
key sifting. (vii) Eve performs positive-valued measures
(POVMs) on each of the stored qubits to guess the bit
value that was obtained by Alice and Bob simultaneously.
She assigns corresponding bit values to her measurement
outcomes. The steps performed by Eve are discussed be-
low (for additional details see Ref. [20]). Since, in our
experiment, we do not have access to QM we simulate
it by performing a reconstruction of the two-qubit den-
sity matrix shared by Eve and Bob and later by project-
ing Bob’s part of the state onto one of the bases used in
QKD. The reduced density matrix describing Eve’s qubit
is assumed to be stored in QM.
Symmetric attacks on QKD can be performed by us-
ing a multifunctional optimal quantum cloner (OQC) [1].
In R04 [11] (explained in Fig. 1) Alice sends one of the
three equally separated equatorial qubits |an〉 = N [|H〉+
exp(i2nπ/3)|V 〉] and Bob detects |bn〉 = N [|H〉 +
exp(i2nπ/3 + iπ/3)|V 〉], where n = 0, 1, 2 and N =
1/
√
2. Since all the states used in R04 (and also in
BB84) are on the equator of the Bloch sphere (say xy
plane), we require that Eve’s action causes the Bloch
sphere of the qubit received by Bob to shrink uniformly
in the xy plane (qubit’s purity decreases) so that her
presence cannot be easily detected. Thus, the density
matrix of Bob’s qubit reads as ρB =
1
2 [1 + (ηˆB~rB) · ~σB ],
where the Bloch-sphere shrinking is described by matrix
ηˆB = diag(η, η, η⊥), where η (η⊥) is the shrinking fac-
tor in the xy plane (z direction), ~r is the Bloch vector
of the initial qubit, and ~σ = (σx, σy, σz) is a vector of
Pauli’s matrices. Our OQC [1] provides the following
shrinking factors η = 2
√
pΛΛ¯ and η⊥ = Λ
2 + Λ¯2(p − q),
where q + p = 1 and Λ2 + Λ¯2 = 1 assuming that
p, q, Λ, Λ¯ ∈ [0, 1], where p is the asymmetry parameter of
the clones and Λ is the cloning “strength” since it affects
the purity of the clones (related to the shrinking factors)
in the same way. In our experiment we fix values of p and
Λ by adjusting polarization sensitive filtering in BDAs
(see Fig. 2 and Ref. [20]). Moreover, for Eve’s probe we
obtain ηˆE(p,Λ) = ηˆB(q,Λ). This operation is similar to
the one of the mirror phase-covariant cloner [1, 22]. The
difference depends on p which implies that the states of
Eve and Bob have different fidelities with respect to the
states sent by Alice. Furthermore, the fidelity of Bob’s
qubits is FB(p,Λ) = (1+2
√
pΛΛ¯)/2, whereas Eve obtains
FE(p,Λ) = FB(q,Λ). The unitary cloning transforma-
tion reads as |H〉A → [Λ|H,H, 0〉+Λ¯|ψ(p), 1〉]B,E,anc and
|V 〉A → [Λ|V, V, 1〉 + Λ¯|ψ(q), 0〉]B,E,anc, where |ψ(p)〉 =√
p|H,V 〉+√q|V,H〉. The resulting state shared by Bob
and Eve is obtained by tracing out the ancilla, which
in our experiment corresponds to random switching be-
tweenH- and V -polarized photons used by Eve as probes.
For p = Λ2 = 1/2 the OQC becomes the symmetric
1→ 2 phase-covariant cloner [23], which for BB84 causes
QBER = 1 − FB = 14.6%. Moreover, for p = 1/2 and
Λ2 = 2/3, the OQC becomes the universal cloner [24].
We assume Eve’s probe to be a qubit, while the most
general approach requires the probe to be a four-level
system. Our restriction is valid if two-photon interac-
tions [1] are only used for the eavesdropping.
Optimal eavesdropping strategy. — Eve knows the ini-
tial state of her photon as her OQC performs conditional
operations [1, 20], where the asymmetry is implemented
by introducing additional losses [25]. However, Eve, to
optimize her attack on R04, must choose the optimal
strategy for distinguishing between Bob’s measurement
results bn and bn⊕1 given that Alice sent an and an⊕2,
respectively, where ⊕ stands for sum modulo 3. While
restricting Eve’s readout to the von Neumann’s measure-
ments we found the optimal ones maximizing Eve’s infor-
mation (this follows from the symmetry of the shrinking
factors) to be equivalent to Helstrom’s measurements [26]
discriminating between states |bn〉 and |bn⊕1〉 (or |an〉 and
|an⊕2〉) independent of the values Λ, p, and the initial
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FIG. 2: (Color online) Experimental setup as described in the
text. States of the probed and ancillary photons are prepared
with half-wave (HWP) and quarter-wave (QWP) plates. The
photons overlap on the polarization-dependent beam split-
ter (PDBS) and undergo polarization-sensitive filtering in the
beam divider assemblies (BDAs). Each BDA (see figure inset)
consists of a pair of beam dividers (BDs), a neutral density
filter (F), and a half-wave plate (HWP). The tomography of
the two-photon state is accomplished by means of the HWPs,
QWPs, polarizing beam splitters (PBDs), and single-photon
detectors (D).
state of the probe. Thus, Eve’s measurement is a pro-
jection on equatorial qubits of phase 2nπ/3 + π/6 +mπ
(2nπ/3+5π/6+mπ) if Bob’s message (see Fig. 1) is !|bn〉
(!|bn⊕2〉), where m = 0, 1 is Eve’s bit value. For BB84,
Eve uses the measurement as Bob.
For the measurements we calculated [20] the mu-
tual Shannon information IX,Y between the three users,
where X,Y stand the initials of the corresponding par-
ties. Next, we calculated the secret-key rate (i.e., the
lower bound on the distilled key length per number of the
sifted-key bits) R = IA,B−min(IA,E , IB,E) [27] as a func-
tion of Λ and p. Finally, we found the optimal cloning
attack by maximizing IA,B for R = 0. The results of our
theoretical analysis, as summarized in Fig. 3, imply that
the optimal (cloning restricted) two-level-probe individ-
ual attack on R04 yields QBER = 16.7% for Λ2 = 4/11
and p = 4/7. Our results for the analogous strategy for
BB84 are shown in Fig. 3, where the best attack yields
QBER = 16.7% for Λ2 = 1/3 and p = 1/2. The QBER
depends on the fidelity of cloning [QBER = 1 − FB for
BB84 and QBER = 4(1−FB)/(5− 2FB) for R04], while
the information extracted by Eve depends both on the
fidelity (as does IA,E) and the entanglement of clones
(correlations between Bob’s and Eve’s qubits). Thus,
the optimal attack must balance these two quantities to
provide R = 0 for a given IA,B.
Experimental aspects of the eavesdropping. — In order
to implement the cloning attack, we employed the exper-
imental setup (see Fig. 2), which consists of three main
parts: the source of photon pairs, the cloner and the two-
photon polarization analyzer. Spatially-separated pho-
ton pairs of λ = 826nm wavelength are created in non-
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Cloning parameters, QBER and the
cloning-attack security of the (a) BB84 and (b) R04 as a
function of the cloning asymmetry parameter p and cloning
“strength” Λ. Dashed red lines show the QBER bound cor-
responding to the zero-length distilled key, i.e., R = IA,B −
min(IA,E, IB,E) = 0. Thus, cloning enables successful eaves-
dropping in the regions marked by names of the QKDs. The
optimal cloning attacks cause QBER = 16.7% if p = 0.57 and
Λ2 = 0.36 (point O′′) for R04 and p = 0.5 and Λ2 = 0.33
(point O′) for BB84. The vertical solid red lines show the
QBER bounds on the privacy of directly transmitted informa-
tion corresponding to IA,B = IA,E , which are equal to 15.0%
for R04 and 14.6% for BB84. The area of Λ2 ≥ 1/2 (Λ2 = 1/2)
corresponds to the mirror phase-covariant OQC [22] (the
asymmetric phase-covariant OQC [5, 25]). Hatched areas in-
dicate the range of the cloning attacks without using quantum
memory.
colinear type I degenerate spontaneous parametric down-
conversion process in LiIO3 crystal (1 cm thick) pumped
by a cw Kr+ laser beam (TEM00 mode, 250mW of op-
tical power). Our source approximates two synchronized
SPSs with the accuracy adequate for our demonstration,
since the probability of having more than one photon
in a mode for the 1 ns detection window is much lower
than the probability of single-photon detection (approx.
10−5 [20]). The emitted photons are in a separable po-
larization state; hence, Alice’s state encoded as the signal
does not change the polarization of the probe. Random
choice of the states sent by Alice ensures that the po-
larization of the two photons is uncorrelated. This cor-
responds to having two independent but synchronized
SPSs. However, in a real attack Eve would have to use
a separate SPS. The photons propagate from the source
to the OQC input via single-mode fibers. The photons
are coherently superposed on the polarization-dependent
beam splitter (PDBS). Next, the photons are subjected
to polarization-sensitive filtering in both output modes
(see BDA in Fig. 2). Finally, we postselect on coinci-
dences – one photon in each of the two output modes of
the cloner – and carry out polarization analysis of the
two-photon state [28]. Using our tomographical data, we
estimated the two-photon density matrix applying the
maximum likelihood method [29]. We used the tomogra-
phy results to numerically simulate Eve’s attack assum-
4TABLE I: Performance of the OQC for BB84 and R04. The
experimental values (subscript E) of the QBER and the
secret-key rate R calculated from the measured density matri-
ces are compared with theoretical predictions (subscript T ).
The success probability ps of the OQC was estimated as in
Ref. [1]. The OQC parameters p and Λ determine the shrink-
ing of the Bloch sphere due to the cloning.
QKD R QBER ps p Λ
2
BB84T 0.00 16.7% 13.7% 1/2 1/3
BB84E 0.03± 0.03 18.5% ± 1.5% 15.1% ± 1.1% 1/2 1/3
R04T 0.00 16.7% 12.7% 4/7 4/11
R04E 0.01± 0.08 18.0% ± 3.5% 7.4% ± 0.1% 4/7 4/11
ing that she probes Alice’s photon, keeps the probe until
key sifting, and passes the probed photon to Bob (for de-
tails see Ref. [20]). We calculated the QBER and secret-
key rate and compared them with theoretical predictions
in Table I.
The results indicate that our attack would be possible
if QM was available. However, to deploy this device in
a real QKD network, one has to consider several techno-
logical aspects of this attack. First, because of its prob-
abilistic nature, the OQC introduces losses. The success
probability of 10%− 20% corresponds to 7-10dB losses.
Observing such losses might indicate that the line is inse-
cure. Thus, Eve must mask these losses as usual channel
losses. Supposing typical fibers losses of 3.5 dB/km (as
for the fibers in our experiment and in [1]), Eve would
need to replace 2-3 km of the line with a fiber of negligi-
ble losses. Using photons at telecom wavelengths would
be more practical than 826 nm light for communicating
over large distances since, for the telecom-window wave-
lengths, the loses are ∼0.2 dB/km [1, 2], which makes the
distances about ten times larger and Eve’s task more dif-
ficult. Typical detectors, designed for the telecom regime,
provide low efficiency of about 0.25 (approx. 6 dB of
losses) and high dark-count rate, i.e., noise. Much larger
losses, which could enable eavesdropping, appear for
long-range free-space transmission reaching, e.g., 157dB
for photons reflected from the Ajisai satellite [30]).
Eve should also control the unsuccessful cases when
the signal and the probe propagate to Bob, who can de-
tect them and raise alarm. Eve can achieve this by using
quantum nondemolition (QND) measurement [31]. If she
does not find a photon in her output mode, she will close
the line towards Bob. Finally, Eve’s attack relies on the
perfect overlap between the signal and the probe photons
(Hong-Ou-Mandel’s interference). Typical full width at
half maximum (FWHM) of photons generated via spon-
taneous parametric down-conversion corresponds to tens
of µm. Thus, the requirement on the two-photon overlap
is of the order of µm. This corresponds to a few fs. Any
jitter caused by Alice leads to the reduced two-photon
overlap, lower purity and fidelity of the output states.
Eve can however overcome this by performing the QND
detection at her OQC input, which triggers the cloning
process but requires photon generation on demand. In
a real cloning attack Eve has to prepare photons of the
same spectral properties as the photons sent by Alice. In
our experiment we use photons at 826nm with spectral
width FWHM=8.9 nm (160 fs coherence time). These are
typical values reached by Alice using a femtosecond laser
as a photon source. Let us note that the photon peaks
need to overlap as perfectly as possible making the ac-
ceptable time difference corresponding to a fraction of
coherence time which changes as wavelength squared di-
vided by FWHM. Hence, overlapping is easier for longer
wavelengths (e.g., in the telecom window) and narrow
FWHM. Both the parameters should be tuned by Alice
to maximize the security of the QKD.
Conclusions. —We investigated the feasibility of sym-
metric individual attacks on BB84 [10] and R04 [11] as-
suming that Eve tracks the key sifting and uses a multi-
functional OQC [1]. We optimized quantum cloning such
that the minimum mutual information between an eaves-
dropper and a legitimate user was equal to the mutual
information between the legitimate users at the lowest
QBER. Thus, legitimate users cannot distil a secret key
from their raw key bits. Consequently we found tolerable
QBER for this kind of attack to be 16.7% for BB84 and
R04. We performed the proof-of-principle experiment in
which R ≈ 0 was attained for QBER = 18.5%± 1.5% for
BB84 and QBER = 18.0%± 3.5% for R04. Our experi-
ment together with the reported progress in development
of QM (see, e.g., [14]) suggest that, even in the presence
of SPSs and perfect detectors, the QKD could be success-
fully attacked with a probe similar to ours if Alice and
Bob tolerate too high QBER (see Table I) or losses (ap-
prox. 7 dB for our device). Our experiment shows that
the OQCs are interesting both from the fundamental and
practical points of view as tools of quantum cryptanaly-
sis as they establish the security bound for an important
class of QKDs.
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6Supplementary material:
In this supplement we give more technical details on
cloning transformations, cloning-based hacking and ex-
perimental data processing. We also compare graphically
our theoretical and experimental tomographic results.
I. THE CLONING MACHINE
A. Cloning transformation
The general phase-covariant cloning transformation is
given by
|0〉a → Λ|000〉b,e,c + Λ¯(√p|01〉b,e +√q|10〉b,e)|1〉c,
|1〉a → Λ|111〉b,e,c + Λ¯(√p|10〉b,e +√q|01〉b,e)|0〉c (1)
in the Hilbert space of the two clones of Bob in mode
b and Eve in mode e extended by an ancillary mode c.
Moreover, 0 (1) denotes horizontal H (vertical V ) polar-
ization, while Λ¯ =
√
1− Λ2 and p = 1 − q are positive
real numbers. The mode c has to be traced out to provide
the state shared by Bob and Eve. The transformation (1)
equally disturbs all the equatorial qubits,
|an〉 = 1√
2
[|0〉 + exp (iφn) |1〉] , (2)
where n = 0, 1, .... We experimentally implemented the
cloning transformation, given by Eq. (1), by fixing the
values of Λ and p, and by introducing polarization sensi-
tive losses in the BDAs.
Eve, to make her cloning-based eavesdropping not eas-
ily detectable, ensures that 0’s and 1’s are measured by
Bob with the same probability. To achieve this, Eve
uses one of the following transformations with probability
1/2 :
U0|an, 0〉 = C0[Λ|00〉 + Λ¯eiφn(√q|01〉 +√p|10〉)],
U1|an, 1〉 = C1[Λ|11〉 + Λ¯eiφn(√q|10〉 +√p|01〉)],(3)
where Cx =
√
px/2 with px (x = 0, 1) being the suc-
cess probability of the transformation Ux including the
transmission losses and the probability of having a single
photon in each mode. Note that px should not depend
on n since the cloning is phase-covariant, but because of
experimental imperfections this is not always true. How-
ever, if px does not change much with nm, which is the
case of our cloner [1], one can replace it with the average
over n. The transformations Ux are implemented by over-
lapping the signal and probe photons on the polarization-
dependent beam splitter and polarization-dependent fil-
ters. It is apparent that in general the resulting state
shared by Bob and Eve is a mixed state. For convenience
in the following sections we will use shorthand notation
|ψx,n〉 = Ux|an, x〉.
B. Cloning parameters and polarization-sensitive
losses
In our implementation we randomly swap between H
and V initial polarizations of the probe. If the probing
photon is initially H-polarized then in order to set Λ and
p we have to ensure the following transmittance ratios:
τb,H
τb,V
=
(
Λ
Λ¯
√
p
)2
(1− µ)(1 − ν)
(1− 2µ)2 ,
τe,H
τe,V
=
(
Λ
Λ¯
√
1− p
)2
µν
(1− 2µ)2 , (4)
where τx,y stands for the intensity transmittance of the
polarization y = H,V in the spatial mode of Bob
(x = b) and Eve (x = e); µ and ν stand for the am-
plitude transmittance for the H and V polarizations
of the polarization-dependent beam splitter. In the
ideal case, the latter transmittances should be equal to
µ =
(
1 + 1/
√
3
)
/2 and ν =
(
1− 1/√3) /2. Due to
manufacturing imperfections, the real transmittances are
µ = 0.77 and ν = 0.19. If the probe is initially V -
polarized, we fix
τb,H
τb,V
=
(
Λ¯
√
1− p
Λ
)2
(2ν − 1)2
2(1− µ)(1− ν) ,
τe,H
τe,V
=
(
Λ¯
√
p
Λ
)2
(2ν − 1)2
µν
. (5)
All the transmittances are set according to Eq. (5) in the
corresponding BDAs.
II. GAINING INFORMATION FROM A CLONE
A. The R04 protocol
In the R04 protocol states sent by Alice and then mea-
sured by Bob read as
|an〉 = 1√
2
[
|0〉 + exp
(
iπ
2n
3
)
|1〉
]
,
|bn〉 = 1√
2
[
|0〉 + exp
(
iπ
2n+ 1
3
)
|1〉
]
, (6)
where n = 0, 1, 2. Let us assume that Bob announces
that he did not measure state |bn〉. If the protocol is con-
tinued that means that Alice sent |an〉 or |an⊕1〉, which
corresponds to Alice obtaining bit value 1 or 0, corre-
spondingly. The bit value obtained by Bob depends on
what he measured. If Bob measured |bn⊕2〉 (|bn⊕1〉), then
his bit is 1 (0). Since Eve waits for the Bob’s announce-
ment, she knows the number n. Moreover, she knows the
initial state of her qubit |x〉 and by using this knowledge
she performs the adequate POVM on her qubit. Eve de-
signs POVMs |e1(x, n)〉〈e1(x, n)| (|e0(x, n)〉〈e0(x, n)|) in
advance in order to discriminate between Alice and Bob
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FIG. 4: (Color online) The reconstructed two-photon state
ρex shared by Eve and Bob compared to the experimental
prediction ρth if Eve has probed |a1〉 with the H-polarized
photon in R04: (a) theory and (b) experiment. The fidelity of
experimental matrix calculated as F =
(
Tr
√√
ρthρex
√
ρth
)2
is 98%. The complete density matrix describing Bob’s and
Eve’s photons is a mixture of density matrices for Eve using
V - and H-polarized photons.
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FIG. 5: (Color online) Same as in Fig. 4 but for BB84, where
Eve has probed |a0〉 with the V -polarized photon. Here, the
fidelity of experimental matrix is 96%.
both getting 1’s (0’s). The joint probability of obtaining
bit values k by Alice, l by Bob, and m by Eve is given by
px,n(k, l,m) = Nx,n|〈bn⊕(1+l), em(x, n)|ψx,n⊕(1−k)〉|2,
(7)
where the normalization constant Nx,n ensures that∑
k,l,m px,n(k, l,m) = 1. Therefore, the final probabil-
ity distribution is given as
p(k, l,m) =
1
6
1∑
x=0
2∑
n=0
px,n(k, l,m). (8)
In order to calculate |em(x, n)〉 let us first introduce the
following ancillary states
|ǫm(x, n)〉 = 〈bn⊕(1+m)|ψx,n⊕(1−m)〉, (9)
where m = 0, 1. For the ancillary states we can calculate
the Bloch vectors as
~ǫm(x, n) = 〈ǫm(x, n)|~σ|ǫm(x, n)〉, (10)
where ~σ = (σx, σy, σz). Then, one can easily derive the
Bloch vectors describing the Eve’s POVMs as follows
~em =
~ǫm − ~ǫ1−m
|~ǫm − ~ǫ1−m|
= (sin θm cosϕm, sin θm sinϕm, cos θm). (11)
These measurement directions are known to be optimal
for the state estimation and correspond to Helstrom’s
measurement. With the help of Eq. (11), Eve’s POVMs
are defined by the following pure states
|em〉 = cos θm
2
|0〉 + eiϕm sin θm
2
|1〉. (12)
Therefore, for the R04 protocol we are able to easily cal-
culate the joint probability distribution of all the parties
obtaining various bit values by knowing the state shared
by Eve and Bob after the cloning transformation. In our
experiment this state is obtained by the two-qubit polar-
ization tomography (see Fig. 4).
B. The BB84 protocol
In the BB84 protocol states sent by Alice and measured
by Bob read as
|an〉 = 1√
2
[
|0〉 + exp
(
iπ
n
2
)
|1〉
]
,
|bn〉 = 1√
2
[
|0〉 + exp
(
iπ
n
2
)
|1〉
]
, (13)
where n = 0, 1, 2, 3. In case of the BB84 protocol Alice
sends |a0〉 and |a2〉 for the first basis (e.g., X basis), and
|a1〉 and |a3〉 for the second basis (e.g., Y basis). For the
analyzed class of attacks, we assume that Eve knows the
basis because she listens to the public announcements of
Alice and Bob. Since Eve focuses only on the cases when
the bases of Alice and Bob match, we can simply write
the joint probability function as
px,y(k, l,m) = Nx,y|〈b2l+y, em|ψx,2k+y〉|2, (14)
where Nx,y = 1/
∑
k,l,m px,y(k, l,m) and x, y = 0, 1 enu-
merate the initial state of Eve’s qubit and the basis in
the BB84 protocol, correspondingly. Therefore, the final
probability distribution, which is used to calculate the
mutual information between all the parties, is given as
p(k, l,m) =
1
4
1∑
x,y=0
px,y(k, l,m). (15)
8However, as in the case of the R04 protocol, we need to
express |em(x, y)〉 in terms of the information available
to Eve. The qubits obtained by Eve read as
|ǫm(x, y)〉 = 〈by+2m|ψx,y+2m〉. (16)
Next, Eve constructs her POVMs analogously to the case
of R04, i.e., by first using Eq. (11) and then Eq. (12).
C. Experimental data processing
Since, in our experiment, we automatically reconstruct
a two-photon density matrix describing a pure state
shared by Bob and Eve
ρx,n = p
−1
x |ψx,n〉〈ψx,n|. (17)
In our experiment the purity of the two reconstructed
components is usually about 97% (see Figs. 4 and 5).
We are able to calculate the probability distributions
pk,l,m directly from the experimental data using Eqs. (8)
and (15). This is because we can rewrite the expressions
for the probabilities comprising the joint distributions us-
ing the density matrix formalism and the reconstructed
matrices directly. Note that the expression for the joint
probabilities implicitly assume that the success rate is
uniform for all the configurations.
This success rate ps, assumed to be uniform, is esti-
mated in the first approximation by px averaged over
all the equatorial states used in the discussed protocols.
In the experiment we obtain px by comparing coinci-
dence rate with and without applying the polarization-
dependent beam splitter and polarization-dependent fil-
ters. Moreover, if Eve wants Bob’s results to be sym-
metric with respect to swapping between the H and V
polarizations, she should provide (if necessary by intro-
ducing additional losses) ps = px=0 = px=1. Alterna-
tively, if px varies little with x, Eve can do nothing and
then ps can be approximated by (p0+p1)/2. The success
rates ps given in Tab. I were obtained by the following
prescription.
The measured probability distributions p(k, l,m) ≡
pA,B,E(k, l,m) for Alice, Bob, and Eve having various
bit values are used to establish the real quantum bit er-
ror rate (QBER) for the both analyzed protocols as dis-
cussed in our Letter. However, for establishing the secret
bit rate R of the sifted key bits, first we determine the
mutual Shannon information between the parties using
the standard formula
IX,Y = IY,X =
1∑
x,y=0
pX,Y (x, y) log2
[
pX,Y (x, y)
pX(x)pY (y)
]
,
(18)
where pX,Y (x, y) =
∑1
z=0 pX,Y,Z(x, y, z) and pX(x) =∑1
y=0 pX,Y (x, y) for {X,Y, Z} = {A,B,E}. Using
Eq. (18) one can easily verify that the mutual informa-
tion between Alice and Bob is simply given by IA,B =
1+δ log2 δ+(1−δ) log2(1−δ) in terms of the probability
δ of Bob obtaining a wrong bit value, which corresponds
to the QBER.
Note that the cloning operation works with the success
rate ps < 1 and for the remaining cases we do not detect
any coincidences. Thus, for the particular initial state
of the cloning machine, a fraction of r = 1 − ps of the
photons sent by Alice is absorbed by the cloning machine.
In our experiment this fraction is about r ≈ 80%, which
corresponds to about 7 dB of losses.
III. SOURCE OF SINGLE PHOTONS
In this section we demonstrate that the source of
photons used in our experiments approximates a single-
photon source (SPS) to be used by Alice in QKD. The
SPS is approximated by one of the modes of the down-
converted light. In our experiment the intensity of the
down-converted light is low to ensure that the proba-
bility of generating four (and larger numbers) of pho-
tons is negligible. The photon statistics of such down-
converted beam is described by a thermal distribution
P (n) = n¯n/(1 + n¯n+1) [2] with a small average number
of photons n¯≪ 10−3 (we ensure that in the experiment).
Thus, P (n > 1) ≈ 0 and we work with an approximate
source of photon pairs |1〉|1〉, where each of the photons
is in a different spatial mode.
Generating a photon in the first-order process is a ran-
dom event. The down-conversion events appear inde-
pendently of the number of down-converted photons n in
the time window of 1 ns, thus the probability of having
n photons is given by Poisson’s distribution:
P (λ, n) = λn exp(−λ)/n!, (19)
where λ = n¯ is the average number of photons in the time
window. We can calculate the probability of not detect-
ing any photons in the 1 ns window directly from the
number of detector clicks N = 35× 103 that appeared as
P0 = 1−N×10−9 = 0.999965. This is correct if the usual
time interval between two detection events is larger than
the dead time of the detectors corresponding to about
35 ns. On the other hand, P0 can be also calculated using
a mathematical model of the ON/OFF (bucket) detectors
of efficiency η (in our experiment η = 0.5) as
P0 =
∞∑
n=0
P (λ, n)(1 − η)n, (20)
where the only unknown λ is estimated numerically to
be λ = 7.00× 10−5 assuming P0 = 0.999965 and η = 0.5.
Therefore the probability of having more than one photon
in the time window is equal to
P>1 = 1−
1∑
n=0
P (λ = 7× 10−5, n) = 2.45× 10−9. (21)
9Moreover, since the probability of not having photons in
the 35 ns dead time window is very high as it reaches
P 35(λ = 7.00 × 10−5, n = 0) = 0.9976, the above-
presented reasoning provides results in good agreement
with our other estimates.
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